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RESTORING TRUST IN THE RESPONSIVE CITY 
 
Stephen Goldsmith* and Craig Campbell** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Local government is not broken, just burdened.  The obsolete rules and 
regulations discussed here make the conceptualization of alternatives 
difficult, creating tunnel vision for what is possible and a decrease of overall 
trust in governments. This article argues for the creation of new standards 
that respond to these conditions, specifically through “Regulation 2.0,” an 
accountability model based on adept use of data. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: TRUST IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
“Local” matters now as never before.  Prominent voices across the 
academic and policy communities are drawing attention to role municipal 
government plays in shaping better outcomes for residents of urban 
communities.  Recent groundbreaking research by Stanford economist Raj 
Chetty and his colleagues on inequality in cities emphasizes the importance 
a person’s zip code plays in shaping his or her future economic opportunity.1  
Various scholars, including Bruce Katz of the Brookings Institution, Jennifer 
Bradley of the Aspen Institute, and Benjamin Barber of the Global Parliament 
of Mayors rightly point to cities as the most promising vehicles of change on 
the most intractable problems facing civil society today.2  So what is getting 
in their way? 
Municipal officials take pride in the fact that trust in local government 
consistently ranks higher than state or federal governments.3  But a closer 
examination of trust metrics across all levels of government should raise 
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1 Raj Chetty et al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 
2001-2004, 315 JAMA 1750, 1750-66 (2016). 
2 See generally BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: 
HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 
(2014); BENJAMIN BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS, 
RISING CITIES (2013).  
3 Justin McCarthy, Americans Still Trust Local Government More Than State, GALLUP POLL 
(Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/176846/americans-trust-local-government-stat 
e.aspx. 
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some alarm.  The Edelman Trust Barometer, a global index of civilian trust 
across a range of institutions, reports that trust in government overall 
generally hovers at 40%, a level substantially lower than the NGO, business, 
and media categories.4 Moreover, the trust gap between elites and masses is 
growing.5  The “informed public” – educated individuals who sit at the top of 
the income distribution – reported much higher levels of trust in government 
than their peers in the “mass population.”6  Of the 25 countries in the survey, 
the United States reported the largest gap between the two groups.7   
One test of a truly responsive city could be whether every resident can 
get a rideshare in his own neighborhood, start his own small business, or 
qualify to practice his trade: chances are that those whose access is most 
limited by these obstacles are those who trust in government the least.  The 
attributes of higher levels of government that account for the public's mistrust 
– the polemical rhetoric and inability to act too often characteristic of federal 
government – are less pronounced in municipalities.  Local governments are 
in a prime position to drive change, but change is difficult when a trust 
differential persists.  Given these challenges and limited resources, we ought 
to turn our attention to closing the trust deficit by removing the barriers to 
government responsiveness.  
 
II. PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT IS OBSOLETE 
 
When government fails to be effective at the local level, it is often not 
due to a toxic political climate.  Rather, what prevents local government from 
standing out as the bright spot in American democracy are the calcified 
bureaucratic structures and outdated rules that plague the system.  We 
inherited this structure of local government from the early 20th century when 
Progressive reformers successfully advocated for a rule-based approach to 
public sector management.8  The reformers responded to the cronyism and 
wastefulness, iconized by the corrupt ward politics of the notorious Boss 
Tweed in New York City, that were rampant in cities across the nation at the 
																																								 																				
4 Edelman Trust Barometer: 2016 Executive Summary, EDELMAN, INC. (2016), http://www. 
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ary/ [hereinafter EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER 2016]. 
5 Id. at 2-3. 
6 See id. at 2 (distinguishing “informed public” by the following four criteria: ages 25-64, 
college educated, in top 25% of household income per age group, and reporting significant 
media consumption and engagement in business news and public policy).   
7 Id. at 2-3. 
8 Kenneth Finegold, Traditional Reform, Municipal Populism, and Progressivism: Challenges to 
Machine Politics in Early-Twentieth-Century New York City, 31 URBAN AFF. REV.1, 20-42 
(1995). 
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time.9  The resulting controls were seen then as a means to create stability 
with a clear set of protocols for who could be hired, how contracts were 
awarded, and what behavior was allowable.10   
These efforts pushed city hall to redouble its focus on a hierarchical 
method of manufacturing good government, inspired by the efficiency of the 
division of labor on the Model T assembly line.11  “Performance,” in this 
model, was based on obeisance to the rote.12  But over time, new challenges 
unfold.  The very rules that once enhanced accountability and efficiency now 
stifle the creativity of public sector workers and limit public investments from 
creating opportunities for citizens. 
In the past two decades, “network governance” has come to replace 
“government” as the predominant approach elected officials take to deliver 
public services.13  The barriers between the private, nonprofit, and  
public sectors are becoming more permeable, and governance allows leaders 
to consider the network of once-isolated resources in their sphere of 
influence.  As a result, government – local government especially – is finding 
itself moving away from its exclusive role as a direct service provider to a 
hybrid manager of the public good, producing value by leveraging a variety 
of partners and third parties.  This approach has seen many successes in better 
serving communities, but its potential is limited by a litany of outdated rules 
that can inadvertently function as inhibitors of municipal innovation.   
 
III. THEORY OF CHANGE: THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE 
 
To be effective, city government needs to be trusted.  To be trusted, the 
city needs to be responsive to citizens’ needs.  This proves difficult in a 
Weberian bureaucratic model.14  For a theory of the impact of innovation  
on public trust, we look first to Professor Mark Moore, a colleague of mine  
at the Harvard Kennedy School.  He proposes the “strategic triangle” as a 
comprehensive framework to help government managers decide how to 
commit their organizations to a certain course of action in the interest of 
maximizing public value:  
																																								 																				
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Joseph J. Schiele & Clifford P. McCue, Lean Thinking and its Implications for Public 
Procurement: Moving Forward with Assessment and Implementation, 11 J. PUB. PROCUR-
EMENT 206, 239 (2011). 
12 Id. 
13 See generally STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM EGGERS, GOVERNING BY NETWORK: THE 
NEW SHAPE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2004). 
14 See generally JAMES MARCH & HERBERT SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (2d. ed. 1956).  
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The image [of the strategic triangle] focuses managerial 
attention on the three key questions managers must answer in 
testing the adequacy of their vision of organizational purpose: 
whether purpose is publicly valuable, whether it will be 
politically and legally supported, and whether it is 
administratively and operationally feasible.15 
 
One point on the triangle requires leaders to define the stakes: what 
public value does the organization want to produce?16 Another is to be clear 
about operational capabilities by making pragmatic calculations of what is 
feasible.17  These points require evidence that the targeted outcomes of a given 
action are in fact valuable and effective, and that their costs can be reasonably 
anticipated and sustained.  On Moore’s third point, legitimacy and support, the 
potential of public value is capped.18  This refers to the legal and political 
climate that make actions either viable or not.  Too often, good ideas are not 
implemented because they may be illegal due to misguided administrative 
constraints.  Civil service restrictions, union contracts, and rule-based work 
systems all elevate legal procedure over solving problems.  A revitalized 
interest in innovation in government is demonstrating just what is possible, but 
improbable so long as the current legal structure remains in place.   
 Rules draw a bright line between allowable and unallowable activity and 
are therefore easily enforceable.  Standards instead articulate a policy goal: their 
enforceability is left up to the discretion of those charged with protecting the 
public good.  Progressive reformers created rules to chart the course of 
government in a moral vacuum of good standards.  But times have changed.  
New forms of responsive governance and data-smart decision-making can create 
a standard-based regulatory regime that perpetuates not only the rule, but 
embodies the spirit of the law.   
 
IV. REGULATION 2.0 
 
As part of the recent Regulatory Reform in the 21st Century City 
project at the Harvard Kennedy School, Nick Grossman offers a roadmap for 
regulatory innovation using the “Internet way.”19  He defines the rules 
																																								 																				
15 MARK MOORE, CREATING PUBLIC VALUE: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT 22 (1995). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Nick Grossman, Regulation, The Internet Way: A Data-First Model for Establishing Trust, 
Safety, and Security, DATA-SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Apr. 8, 2015), http://datasmart.ash. 
harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-regulation-the-internet-way-660.  
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developed in the 19th and 20th centuries as the “1.0” approach to regulation.20  
These regulatory strategies “took an ‘up-front permission’ approach, based 
on central licensing and permitting as a prerequisite for acting” and include 
such bureaucratic procedures as small business permitting, background 
checks, and pet registration.21 They are slow by design, intending to promote 
policy goals by precluding problems that might arise later on.   
A better regulatory system, Grossman argues, transitions from the 
ethos of permission to “Regulation 2.0,” an accountability model based on 
adept use of data.22 It is with Regulation 2.0 that companies such as eBay 
achieve accountability without a hardline regulation handed down by 
government.  Users may act freely but are held to account for the data they 
produce.  This model accommodates quick scaling, which is crucial for 
digital platforms that may have millions of active users and are constantly 
adding more.  For this reason, Regulation 2.0 is also the strategy employed 
by Internet governing bodies, which use a standards-based approach.  On this 
point, Grossman writes:  
 
Standards-setting is a negotiation among many stakeholders, 
not a command-and-control process, and it’s more art than 
science.  But, once adopted, the existence of these standards 
enables broad innovation, since all of the players (app 
developers, infrastructure builders, regulators, etc.) know the 
terms of engagement and can build freely, without needing to 
seek permission first.23 
 
The Internet is a decentralized but coherent structure that supports an 
array of interconnected but distinct platforms – not unlike a city.  Just look to 
the array of domains – commercial (.com), nonprofit (.org), and governmental 
(.gov) – that operate, much like in a city, on its shared infrastructure.  
Grossman’s central contention is that cities should be regulated, like the 
Internet, with a network governance approach.24  Regulatory reform “the 
Internet way” is focused on using data to drive action instead of circumscribing 
action with rules, and accommodates government’s obligation to maintain 
standards while supporting innovation.25  Consider the following examples of 
issues inherent to regulation 1.0 and their potential 2.0 remedies. 
 
																																								 																				
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
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V. PUBLIC WORKERS: RULE ENFORCERS OR SOLUTION PROVIDERS? 
 
Municipal health and sanitation officials abide by strict codes that 
leave frontline workers little room for nuanced responses to situations that 
arise on the job.  Take restaurant inspections.  The sheer volume of food 
establishments in a city—Chicago, for instance, has more than 15,000—
makes proper attention to each difficult.26  As a result, small business owners 
are often fined for violations that do not present substantive health or safety 
risks.  If the temperature of a restaurant’s cheese stock is even a sliver above 
the government-mandated level, an inspector writes a ticket, regardless of 
whether the cheese had just been delivered or was just about to be sold.  Sushi 
chefs who forego gloves in order to prepare sushi in the culturally sanctioned 
(and exceptionally sanitary) way face a similar compliance risk.27  Such pains 
are exceptions rather than the norm, but to deliver such a burden to those 
whom public officials should be enabling is irresponsible given the 
alternatives in plain sight. 
Imagine an alternative scenario: an inspector finds a nominal 
violation but determines no health concern is at stake.  She decides not to 
write a ticket, but flags this decision as an exception in a tablet-based 
software.  The data trail creates a record that her manager can instantly view 
to determine whether the use of discretion was appropriate.  The concept of 
such “documented exceptions,” which was developed in the context of 
regulatory reform in child welfare, refers to cases in which a rule is not 
enforced but “the worker can explain and substantiate the reason for 
deviation.”28  The idea, which holds as true in health inspections as it does in 
social work, is that the standards to which worker’s behavior is held “must 
be both learned and elaborated in the course of practice.”29  In this model, the 
public employees who exercise discretion inappropriately can be weeded out 
with data analytics – but only if the regulatory climate allows it. 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
26 Sean Thornton, Delivering Faster Results with Food Inspection Forecasting, DATA-
SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (May 19, 2015), http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/ 
delivering-faster-results-with-food-inspection-forecasting. 
27See generally Glen Collins, Even the A Students Sometimes Break Health Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/dining/new-york-city-restaur 
ants-skirt-inspections-finer-points.html (providing an examination of the way chefs feel 
encumbered by regulations that leave little room for time-tested culinary practices). 
28 Kathleen G. Noonan et al, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: 
Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 536 (2009). 
29 Id. at 537.   
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VI. REGULATING FOR RESULTS 
 
Back in 1995 when I was mayor of Indianapolis, a taxi cartel enjoyed 
exclusive rights to the city’s 392 only taxi licenses – and wanted to keep it 
that way.30  The incumbent companies argued that limiting the number of 
licenses was the only way to ensure that only safe cars and safe drivers were 
on the road.  But other, more direct standards for drivers and vehicles could 
be used to achieve the same result without artificially limiting the number of 
providers, so I pushed to both eliminate the caps and simplify safety 
regulations.  As a result, the number of taxi companies, most owned by 
minorities or by women, nearly doubled.  Fares dropped significantly, and 
the number of customer complaints went down.31  
When Uber began infiltrating American cities five years ago, it relied 
on innovative technologies to disrupt an industry that had relied long relied 
on its cartel status.32  The structure of the business, relying as it does on 
smartphone technology, mostly worked around, not through, city hall.  Old 
regulatory approaches cannot easily adapt to new service models, illustrated 
by the conflict between the ridesharing “platform model” and a reactive 
regulatory environment.33 Today, municipalities are racing to determine how 
they will confront the challenge that Uber is creating for government’s 
traditional approach to ensuring transit standards.  Some are doing better than 
others.  Los Angeles, for instance, is taking on the role of “mobility manager” 
by forming partnerships with companies working in the sharing economy.34 
To return to Moore’s strategic triangle, Los Angeles shifted out of its reactive 
role as regulator by changing the legal environment in the transportation 
marketplace, generating a return of public value in the form of enhanced 
citizen mobility. 
																																								 																				
30 See Steven Hayward, Slashing Through the Regulation Thicket, HOOVER INST. POL’Y REV. 
(Nov. 1, 1998), http://www.hoover.org/research/slashing-through-regulation-thicket (descri-
bing Indianapolis Mayor Goldsmith’s effort to overcome special interests and bureaucratic 
structures, particularly within taxicab regulation).  
31 WILLIAM EGGERS & JOHN O’LEARY, REVOLUTION AT THE ROOTS: MAKING OUR 
GOVERNMENT SMALLER, BETTER, AND CLOSER TO HOME 284 (1995). 
32  Ramon Casadesus-Masanell et al., Uber and the Taxi Economy, HARVARD BUS. SCH. 
CASE (Mar. 2015). 
33 Stephen Goldsmith, A Gathering Revolution in Regulation, GOVERNING (Aug. 19, 2015) 
http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/gov-cities-regulation-revolution-technology-data-anal 
ysis-uber.html. 
34 See Stephen Goldsmith, L.A.'s Testing Ground for Transportation Efficiency, GOVERNING 
(Mar. 16, 2016) http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/gov-los-angeles-transportation-efficie 
ncy-mobility-management.html (“These partnerships are creating a growing aware-ness of 
the range of possibilities posed by a city’s traffic and population movement data, including 
more surgical policy interventions and better outcome evaluation.”). 
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VII. A REMARK ON TRUST AND SOCIAL EQUITY 
 
Municipal policies and practices that have existed unexamined for 
decades can have inequality baked into their core.  The New York Times 
recently published an editorial titled “A Modern System of Debtor Prisons,” 
which lambasts state and local courts for punishing those who commit minor 
offenses with severe financial penalties that could push them into poverty.35  
A similar 2015 report in the Los Angeles Times found that the delivery of 
basic city services, such as filling a pothole, disproportionately favored those 
in wealthier neighborhoods.36  Even snow removal becomes a social concern 
when parking restrictions are disproportionately enforced in low-income 
areas, leaving poorer residents to pay for towed cars more often than their 
wealthier neighbors.37  
While these findings are troubling, they also signal nascent progress.  
That these determinations can be made is a testament to the way that data is 
getting better and transparency is increasing in government.  As we begin to 
better quantify the results of policies, we can become more responsive in 
making adjustments—whether to their authorizing language or to the way 
they are applied.   
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
The Edelman Trust Barometer helps us not only understand the 
problem, but the solution as well.  The report points to the widespread shift 
of influence from “authority” to the mass public.38  This situation is hardly 
surprising and parallels the growth of the 2.0 regulatory model – think 
Amazon product ratings or Yelp reviews.  There is no dearth of technological 
tools and innovative programs aimed at amplifying community voices.  But 
																																								 																				
35 James Bennet et al., A Modern System of Debtor Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/opinion/a-modern-system-of-debtor-prisons.html. 
36 Ben Poston & Peter Jamison, Inequity is 'baked in' when it comes to L.A. city services; 
where you live matters, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-
adv-city-service-20150829-story.html (“The findings parallel those in a Times report earlier 
this month, which found that city crews respond to complaints of illegally dumped refuse at 
dramatically different rates in many of the city's 114 neighborhoods.  And poorer areas 
generally received worse service than wealthier ones.”).   
37 In the process of implementing a citywide race equity plan in St. Paul, Minnesota, the 
Government Alliance on Race Equity (GARE) in partnership with the city found that snow 
removal was disproportionately affecting St. Paul’s racial minorities. The city has since 
changed its processes and implemented an accountability strategy based on better organized 
collection and visualization of street sensor and weather data.  Interview with Mayor of St. 
Paul, Minnesota (2015).  
38 Edelman Trust Barometer 2016, supra note 4, at 9. 
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for these tools to fully realize their potential and deliver improvements to 
government services and community engagement, they need to be 
accompanied by a concomitant shift in the structure local government – one 
that encourages innovation rather than stifling it.   
Local government is not broken, just burdened.  The obsolete rules 
and regulations discussed here make the conceptualization of alternatives 
difficult, creating tunnel vision for what is possible.  Creating new standards 
that respond to these conditions takes imagination, which, broadly writ, 
means the ability to come up with something new and unique.  Good data 
provide a way to see cities, not as 20th century bureaucrats intended them to 
be, but in the present reality.  Open data and analytics enhance the 
effectiveness of social services and give a better understanding of whether a 
public service is being delivered equitably and for whom it is being delivered.  
In order to restore trust and amplify social impact, responsive public officials 
today must take these insights to heart to imagine the city not as it was, but 
what it could be. 
 
